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Abstract
The current generation of IoT devices is being used by
clients and consumers to regulate resources (such as water
and electricity) obtained from critical infrastructure (such
as urban water services and smart grids), creating a new
attack vector against critical infrastructure. In this research
we show that smart irrigation systems, a new type of green
technology and IoT device aimed at saving water and money,
can be used by attackers as a means of attacking urban
water services. We present a distributed attack model that
can be used by an attacker to attack urban water services
using a botnet of commercial smart irrigation systems. Then,
we show how a bot running on a compromised device in a
LAN can: (1) detect a connected commercial smart irrigation
system (RainMachine, BlueSpray, and GreenIQ) within 15
minutes by analyzing LAN’s behavior using a dedicated
classification model, and (2) launch watering via a commer-
cial smart irrigation system according to an attacker’s wishes
using spoofing and replay attacks. In addition, we model the
damage that can be caused by performing such an attack
and show that a standard water tower can be emptied in an
hour using a botnet of 1,355 sprinklers and a flood water
reservoir can be emptied overnight using a botnet of 23,866
sprinklers. Finally, we discuss countermeasure methods and
hypothesize whether the next generation of plumbers will
use Kali Linux instead of a monkey wrench.
1. Introduction
A variety of IoT devices are being deployed across cities
around the world as part of the smart city trend. Hundreds of
cities in Europe, Asia, Australia, America, and even Africa,
have already adopted smart city technologies and use them
to obtain information that helps them manage assets and
resources efficiently [1], [2]. IoT devices are currently used
by consumers and clients to regulate and monitor resources
obtained from critical infrastructure including energy, water,
etc. The interface between an IoT device with Internet
connectivity (which is located on the consumer side) and
the cyber-physical system (CPS) of critical infrastructure
(which is located on the provider side) necessitates that
all of the connected links between the two meet the most
rigorous security standards. Cyber attacks targeted at critical
infrastructure may result in urban disaster as happened in the
cyber attack against Ukraine’s power grid which left 700,000
people without electricity for several hours [3]. In order to
prevent attackers from attacking the networks and physical
systems of critical infrastructure, various steps are taken
to secure these systems, including: (1) buying equipment,
hardware, and systems from trusted parties, (2) deploying
an= security solution such as IDS/IPS, and (3) physically
disconnecting the networks from the Internet (air-gapping
their networks). While critical infrastructures minimize any
possible attack vector against them, IoT devices with Inter-
net connectivity that are located on the consumer side (e.g.,
in smart homes, smart cities, etc.) and used to regulate a
resource obtained from the critical infrastructure remain the
weakest link in this interface. Such IoT devices have created
a new attack vector for critical infrastructure and will soon
become a prime target for attackers.
In this paper, we show how critical infrastructure that
adheres to very strict security standards can be attacked indi-
rectly using a botnet of IoT devices with Internet connectiv-
ity. We demonstrate how an attacker can exploit IoT devices,
which are deployed across a smart city and used to regulate
a resource obtained via the CPS of critical infrastructure, as
a means of attacking the critical infrastructure. To make
our discussion about this type of attack more concrete,
we focus on a new type of IoT device: smart irrigation
systems. Considered a green technology, smart irrigation
systems are a good target for analysis because: (1) they
have already been adopted by smart cities (e.g., Barcelona
[4]), agriculture, and the private sector around the world,
(2) they regulate water flow for watering and irrigation, a
resource which is provided by urban water services (critical
infrastructure), and (3) they are considered a key actor in
the smart water grid revolution, because they are aimed at
automating water irrigation in order to save water and will
soon replace most traditional irrigation systems.
First, we present a distributed attack model that can be
used by an attacker to attack urban water services using a
botnet of commercial smart irrigation systems (Section 4).
Then we show how a bot running on a compromised device
in a LAN can: (1) detect a connected commercial smart
irrigation system (RainMachine [5], BlueSpray [6], and
GreenIQ [7]) within 15 minutes by analyzing LAN’s traffic
behavior using a dedicated classification model (Section 6),
and (2) launch watering via a commercial smart irrigation
system according to an attacker’s wishes using spoofing and
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replay attacks (Sections 7 and 8). In addition, we model the
damage that can be caused by performing such an attack
(Section 9) and show that a standard water tower can be
emptied in an hour using a botnet of 1,355 sprinklers and
a flood water reservoir can be emptied overnight using a
botnet of 23,866 sprinklers. We also discuss countermeasure
methods.
In this research, we make the following contributions:
(1) while previous attacks against critical infrastructure re-
quired the attacker to compromise the systems of critical
infrastructure, we present an attack against critical infras-
tructure that does not necessitate compromising the infras-
tructure itself and is done indirectly by attacking attacking
client infrastructure that is not under the control of the
critical infrastructure provider. In addition, we show that
a bot running on a compromised device can (2) detect a
smart irrigation system connected to its LAN in less than
15 minutes, and (3) launch watering via the smart irrigation
system using various methods.
2. Related Work
In this section we describe related work on attacks
against critical infrastructure and provide an overview of
DDoS attacks using IoT devices. Critical infrastructure
has been defined by the European Commission as an "asset
or system which is essential for the maintenance of vital so-
cietal functions" [8]. The Department of Homeland Security
identifies 16 sectors as critical infrastructure including wa-
ter/wastewater systems, energy, nuclear reactors, chemical,
dams, emergency services, etc. [9]. Some of these sectors
provide 24/7 services, while others regulate continuous real-
time processes using dedicated cyber-physical systems such
as controllers, sensors, etc. Definitions mentioned in the
literature for a CPS include a networked/distributed control
system (NCS/DCS), sensor actuator network (SAN), wire-
less industrial sensor network (WISN), industrial control
system (ICS), and supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCADA) networks [10]. In the remainder of this article we
will refer to such systems as CPSs.
The interest of adversaries in attacking a CPS of critical
infrastructure began three and a half decades ago. The first
known cyber attack was launched in 1982 by intruders who
planted a Trojan in the SCADA system that controls the
Siberian pipeline and caused an explosion equivalent to
three kilotons of TNT [11]. In recent years there has been
a significant increase in the number of cyber attacks against
critical infrastructure [12] which can even result in death
[11]. Two famous cyber attacks against critical infrastructure
that were launched during the last 10 years and resulted
in a large amount of damage are the cyber attack against
Ukraine’s power grid which left 700,000 people without
electricity for several hours [3], and Stuxnet which was
targeted at Iran’s nuclear plant and caused a large number
of centrifuges to be taken offline [13].
Air-gapping (isolating the networks from the Internet)
is typically applied to systems of critical infrastructures in
order to prevent attackers from compromising CPSs via the
Internet. Air-gapping requires the attackers to physically
compromise the critical infrastructure in order to attack it.
However, motivated attackers use various attack vectors to
compromise critical infrastructures using: (1) supply chain
attacks [14], (2) innocent or malicious insiders, and (3)
social engineering. Many methods [15], [16] to detect and
mitigate cyber attacks against the CPSs of critical infras-
tructure have been suggested over the years, and security
tools such as IDSs/IPSs are used for this purpose. Recently,
several studies raised concerns regarding the cyber secu-
rity of existing and future critical infrastructure (e.g., the
smart grid) [17], [18], [19], [20], while other studies have
specifically discussed using IoT devices as an attack vector
to disrupt the operation of critical infrastructure [21], [22],
[23], [24].
DDoS attacks are DoS attacks that are usually launched
from a group of compromised devices (botnet); each device
(bot) in the botnet is infected with a malicious agent. A
wide range of studies have been published on this subject,
demonstrating different types of DDoS attacks [25] and
related detection [26] and defense [27] techniques. DDoS
attacks are considered one of the major threats and most
challenging problems of today’s cyber security world [28].
In this overview we focus specifically on distributed attacks
that rely on IoT devices as bots or targets. The earliest
known IoT botnet is Linux/Hydra [29], [30], which was
released in 2008, and specifically aimed at routing devices
based on MIPS architecture [30]. Since 2008, many types
of IoT botnets have appeared in the wild [30]. Probably
the most famous IoT botnet is Mirai, which turned a large
number of IP cameras running the Linux OS into remote
controlled bots that were used to launch a massive DDoS
attack in 2016 [31], [32]. Variants of the Mirai botnet were
found to be used in attacks against different targets during
2017 [32].
Usually, IoT botnets exploit vulnerabilities in operating
systems and protocols in order to compromise devices and
launch their attack [30]. Recently new kinds of DDoS
attacks have been introduced. A recent study [33] described
a TDoS (telephony denial of service) attack against 911
emergency services in which many calls to the service
were triggered simultaneously. The TV was used twice as a
means of launching a distributed attack on smart assistants’
servers, intentionally via a Burger King advertisement [34]
and accidentally via a daily news program [35]. In both
cases, a voice command that was produced from the TV
triggered many smart assistants to launch a large number of
requests to their servers at the same time.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to (1)
present a distributed attack against critical infrastructure that
does not require compromising its systems, and (2) create
a botnet that uses smart irrigation systems connected to the
Internet as means of attacking critical infrastructure.
3. Smart Irrigation Systems
Smart irrigation systems refer to advanced irrigation
systems that incorporate various sensors and network com-
Figure 1. Smart irrigation systems regulate watering by consuming water from the urban water service and interface with various sensors, weather forecast
services, C&C devices, and dedicated cloud servers.
ponents for better efficiency [36]. Smart irrigation systems, a
new type of green technology and IoT device, are equipped
with Internet connectivity that facilitates communication
with sensors, weather forecast services, C&C devices, and
dedicated cloud servers. The prime motive behind the advent
of smart irrigation systems is to enhance the overall water
efficiency of irrigation systems, with minimal user effort.
Internet connectivity is designed to provide remote access
capabilities via any device (mobile, personal computer, etc.)
and automatic adjustment of water consumption based on
data that is retrieved from weather forecast services, without
any manual interaction.
Smart irrigation systems use Internet connectivity for
various operations (e.g., automatic watering regulation, re-
mote C&C, etc.). Most smart irrigation systems provide Wi-
Fi communication via an integrated NIC, however there are
some smart irrigation systems that provide GSM commu-
nication via a GSM dongle with a SIM card (as can be
seen in Shodan’s results when performing a search for the
word "BlueSpray"1). Smart irrigation systems are physically
connected to a set of valves that are connected to the main
water line on one end and to pipelines/sprinklers on the other
end. The valves are controlled by the smart irrigation system
and used to adjust the water flow from the main water line
to sprinklers and droppers. The valves that smart irrigation
systems can control independently are called zones, and the
number of zones varies from 4 to 24 in most typical systems.
Smart irrigation systems were first introduced in 2013,
and in the next few years they will replace most tradi-
tional irrigation systems around the world because (1) they
are inexpensive (their price starts at $100) and designed
to save money and water, (2) they provide a convenient
remote HMI for C&C via smartphones, smart assistants,
and computers, in contrast to traditional irrigation systems
which have a dedicated display, and (3) they monitor water
consumption and present the watering history. In addition to
all of the abovementioned reasons, smart irrigation systems
will replace traditional irrigation systems, because they were
1. https://www.shodan.io/search?query=bluespray
identified by [37], [38], [39] as a key actor in the future
smart water grid architecture, which is referred to as a real-
time two-way network equipped with sensors and devices for
continuous and remote monitoring of the water distribution
system [40].
Smart irrigation systems are designed to support the
following functionality: (1) provide remote HMI commu-
nication (for purposes of scheduling a watering plan, pre-
senting the watering history, etc.) over the Internet to C&C
devices (using a dedicated application for smartphones, a
Web user interface for browsers, and a voice interface for
smart assistants), (2) monitor water consumption, and (3)
automatically adapt the watering plan according to data that
is obtained from weather forecast services (e.g., precipitation
forecast for the next few days) and sensors (e.g., obtain
information regarding soil moisture).
Figure 1 outlines the entire smart irrigation system
ecosystem. As can be seen in Figure 1, smart irrigation
systems typically interface with the following entities:
1) Weather Forecast Service - There are many weather
forecast services on the Internet [41], [42], [43], [44], [45],
[46], [47] that provide a REST API in which a request that
contains the location of the desired weather forecast is sent
from a client and followed by a response from the weather
forecast service that contains the weather forecast (tem-
perature, humidity, wind direction, wind speed, pressure,
cloudiness, etc.) for each hour/part of day for the upcoming
days/week. Smart irrigation systems use weather forecasts
in order to adjust their watering plan and typically launch a
few requests a day to obtain updates.
2) C&C Device - Smart irrigation systems provide an
HMI for C&C that is based on a Web browser, mobile/tablet
application, and smart assistants. The HMI provides smart
irrigation system users with various capabilities to remotely
control and monitor the operation of smart irrigation sys-
tems from anywhere around the world (e.g., to schedule a
watering program, to visualize weekly aggregated watering
consumption data) using a cloud server that mediates be-
tween the C&C device and the smart irrigation system. This
is a very convenient interface compared to that of traditional
Figure 2. The adversarial attack model.
irrigation systems which don’t provide a remote or visual
HMI for C&C.
3) Cloud Server - Each smart irrigation system commu-
nicates with its own cloud server. The primary role of the
cloud server is to mediate between the C&C device and the
smart irrigation system. In addition, the cloud server also
provides a firmware update, stores the smart irrigation sys-
tem’s configuration, and stores the watering history. Smart
irrigation systems typically launch an update request that
contains their identifier to the cloud server once a minute
in order to verify whether new updates have been sent from
the user.
4) Sensors - Smart irrigation systems provide a
wired/wireless interface for sensors (e.g., precipitation, soil
moisture, temperature, and water flow sensors). Based on
the data that is obtained from the connected sensors, smart
irrigation systems adjust the watering plan and regulate their
operation.
In this research we analyzed three commercial smart
irrigation systems: RainMachine [5], BlueSpray [6], and
GreenIQ [7] that were identified as three of the 10 most
advanced smart irrigation systems by [48] and [49]. They
contain up to 24 valves, and they are able to communicate
with sensors (e.g., precipitation sensor) and weather forecast
services.
4. Adversarial Attack Model
In this section we describe the attacker’s threat model.
We consider an attacker, a malicious entity, that applies a
distributed attack on the urban water service using a botnet
of smart irrigation systems in order to cause harm to society.
The attacker’s objective can be any one of the following:
1) To Waste Water - usually, water is purified in a
treatment plant after it has been pumped from a natural
water source (e.g., groundwater). From the treatment plant,
the water is distributed to urban/areal reservoirs and tanks
that distribute water for residents in the entire distribution
area. In some places, areal reservoirs and water tanks are
not physically connected to a treatment plant using pipelines
due to physical limitations. Instead, areal reservoirs are filled
with water shipped to the reservoir on a weekly/monthly ba-
sis or when the reservoir is nearly empty. Applying an attack
that wastes water and empties the urban water reservoir may
result in the inability to provide water to residents until the
local water reservoir can be refilled. In addition, in many
places around the world, there is a serious water shortage
[50], so wasting water is even more dangerous.
2) Financial Damage - attacking smart irrigation sys-
tems increases water consumption and causes financial loss
to cities that use irrigation systems to water parks and private
households that use irrigation systems for watering their
yard/garden. In many places around the world, water is
expensive. For example, the average combined water tariff
in Portland, Oregon is $8.00 per cubic meter of water [51].
3) Reducing Water Flow - by applying a distributed
attack against many smart irrigation systems that are con-
nected by the same pipeline to the urban water service, the
attacker can also reduce water flow in all of the households
connected to the pipeline.
We do not consider a targeted attack against a specific
smart irrigation system (e.g., attacking a neighbor) a dan-
gerous attack, because the result of such an attack is limited
to financial damage to one user (as a result of wasting
water). In contrast, we consider an attack that is directed
at an urban/local water service a very dangerous attack,
because preventing people from accessing a resource from
critical infrastructure can be a disaster [3], depending on the
number of clients affected and prevented from accessing
the resource. Attacking urban water services requires the
attacker to use many smart irrigation systems. Figure 2
presents the attacker’s threat model. A botnet is used by
the attacker to launch massive water consumption by many
smart irrigation systems simultaneously. The attack consists
of three stages:
Stage 1 - infection: the attacker builds a botnet of smart
irrigation systems. The attacker can rent botnet services [52],
[53] which are traded for bitcoin on the darknet. Alterna-
tively, the attacker can infect devices that are connected
to the Internet (e.g., laptop, smartphone, router, etc.) with
malware using common infection vectors (e.g., email attach-
ments, compromised websites, malvertising campaigns, and
supply chain attacks), as can be seen in Figure 2a.
Stage 2 - reconnaissance: each bot searches for smart
irrigation systems that are connected to its LAN. If no con-
nected smart irrigation systems are found, the bot destroys
itself in order to cover its tracks. In Section 6 we show that
a smart irrigation system can be detected in a LAN within
15 minutes by a bot running on a device connected to the
same LAN by analyzing outgoing traffic.
Figure 3. SoC board of commercial irrigation systems: (a) RainMachine
[5], (b) GreenIQ [7], and (c) BlueSpray [6]. The GreenIQ smart irrigation
system contains a Raspberry Pi as the SoC.
Stage 3 - attack: at the appropriate time, the attacker
signals the botnet to apply a distributed attack that results in
massive water consumption of the urban water service. The
attacker uses the bots to attack the smart irrigation systems
connected to their LANs using various attack vectors (we
describe them in Sections 7 and 8) that cause high water
consumption, as can be seen in Figure 2b.
In order to coordinate the DDoS attack, the attacker
communicates with the bots using a C&C server. A com-
mon C&C approach is based on managing bots via one
or more C&C servers located somewhere on the Internet.
The IP addresses or domain names of the C&C server are
hidden in the bots’ code and may be updated later via the
C&C. Upon installation, a bot connects to its C&C server
over a secure network protocol (e.g., HTTPS) and receives
commands. The botnet operator notifies the C&C servers
to send either a START or STOP command to the bots. A
START command will contain parameters such as the start
time and the duration. Optionally, a location can be provided
to ensure that only bots located in a certain geographical
region are activated in order to focus on a specific urban
water service. Additional C&C mechanisms for botnets can
be found in [54]. It is important to note that there are more
advanced topologies which are resilient to being shut down,
e.g., peer-to-peer, hierarchical, and random topologies.
In Sections 6 and 7 we show how a bot can (1) detect
smart irrigation systems in its LAN within 15 minutes, and
(2) control a smart irrigation system using various attacks.
5. Analysis and Reverse Engineering
In this section we describe the analysis that we per-
formed for three commercial smart irrigation systems
(GreenIQ, RainMachine, and BlueSpray). We combined two
techniques: (1) we connected all three smart irrigation sys-
tems to a router and captured their ingoing/outgoing traffic
for a few days. We analyzed their connections with their
C&C devices, cloud servers, and weather forecast services
from the captured PCAP files using Wireshark. In addi-
tion, (2) we reverse engineered commercial smart irrigation
systems by extracting their firmware. The GreenIQ second
generation smart irrigation system is based on a Raspberry
Pi controller board with a connected SD card (as can be
seen in Figure 3b). We copied the content of the SD card
to a laptop using an SD card reader and found 34 Python
files that the firmware is based on. Unlike the GreenIQ smart
irrigation system which uses a Raspberry Pi as its controller
board, RainMachine does not use a commercial board and
designed its own controlling circuitry. We used a USB to
UART adapter (FT232R) to extract RainMachine’s firmware
from the SoC’s UART terminals, a technique that was shown
in [55]. RainMachine runs a modified version of the Android
OS, so we looked for the APK of RainMachine’s application
and found the file RainMachine-UI.apk. We extracted the
APK to Java files using an online decompiler tool. The
firmware of GreenIQ and RainMachine was not obfuscated.
6. Detecting Connected Smart Irrigation Sys-
tems
During the reconnaissance stage, each bot must detect
whether a smart irrigation system is connected to its LAN.
If no smart irrigation system is found, then the bot sends a
notification to the C&C server and destroys itself in order
to cover its tracks. We decided to design and empirically
evaluate a model that detects a connected smart irrigation
system and is used by a bot running on a compromised
device which is connected to the same LAN (of the smart
irrigation system); detection is based on analyzing the cap-
tured network traffic data of suspicious IP. In order to do
so, we connected three commercial smart irrigation systems
(RainMachine [5], BlueSpray [6], and GreenIQ [7]) to a
router via Wi-Fi, and monitored the LAN traffic using a
bot that was installed on a laptop that was connected to the
same LAN (by applying ARP spoofing from the laptop to the
smart irrigation systems). We extracted several features from
the captured traffic data, and appended another set of traffic
data with the same features (collected from various IoT
devices in other research [56]) to them. The IoT data was
obtained from numerous and various IoT device types that
can be found in standard homes nowadays: two smart bulbs,
a smart refrigerator, sixteen security camera, two laptops,
two smartphones, and five smartwatches.
In our preliminary analysis, we explored the average
number of unique destinations that smart irrigation systems
interface with per hour, and compared the results with the
abovementioned IoT devices. As can be seen in Figure
4, the average number of unique destinations that smart
irrigation systems interface with is very low compared with
the smartphones and smart refrigerator. However, a small
average number of unique destinations is a property that is
common to most of the IoT devices we analyzed so it cannot
be used by a bot to determine whether a suspicious IP is a
smart irrigation system or not.
Following this preliminary analysis, we looked for
unique characteristics that could be used by a bot running
Figure 4. The average number of unique destinations that IoT devices
interface with in an hour.
Figure 5. Analysis of the number of TCP sessions opened by smart
irrigation systems to their cloud servers during a typical hour.
on a LAN to decide whether a connected device is a smart
irrigation system or not. Currently, the manufacturers of
smart irrigation systems do not produce any other types
of IoT devices [48], [49]. With this observation in mind,
we decided to analyze the identity of the cloud servers that
smart irrigation systems interface with. Unlike Samsung’s
cloud server which supports many IoT devices manufactured
by Samsung (smart refrigerator, smartphone, etc.), the cloud
servers of the tested smart irrigation systems interface only
with their respective smart irrigation systems. A packet sent
to GreenIQ cloud server cloud server was sent only from
GreenIQ smart irrigation system. The same thing is also true
for BlueSpray and RainMachine during the 26 hour period
of data collection. Hence, due to the absence of overlap
between the contacted cloud servers, an outgoing packet
sent to a smart irrigation system cloud server can clearly and
reliably indicate that the packet’s sender is a smart irrigation
system.
As can be seen in Figure 5, smart irrigation systems
typically interact with their cloud servers several times
per hour (6-11 times). We analyzed the distribution of the
average time between two consecutive outgoing packets
from any smart irrigation system to its cloud server. As
can be seen in Figure 6, for the GreenIQ smart irrigation
system, the average time between two consecutive sessions
Figure 6. Distribution of the time between two consecutive sessions. The
red line represents the 99% percentile for each model.
with its cloud server is much lower than that of BlueSpray
and RainMachine. Overall, the maximum amount of time
between two consecutive sessions with the cloud servers is
15 minutes (the 99th percentile is approximately 10 minutes).
Based on this observation we present Algorithm 1, a
smart irrigation system classification model.
Algorithm 1
1: procedure ISSMARTIRRIGATIONSYSTEM(ip,period)
2: bluespray1 = ”cloud.bluespray.net”
3: bluespray2 = ”www.bluespray.net”
4: greeniq = ”www.greeniq.net”
5: rainmachine = ”proxy1.rainmachine.com”
6: startTime = currentTime()
7: applyMitmAttackToTarget(ip)
8: for packet : nextPacket() do
9: dstIP = packet.ip.dst
10: if dstIP == bluespray1 then
11: return BlueSpray
12: if dstIP == bluespray2 then
13: return BlueSpray
14: if dstIP == greeniq then
15: return GreenIQ
16: if dstIP == rainmachine then
17: return RainMachine
18: if startTime + period >= currentTime() then
19: return None
Algorithm 1 receives as input an IP of a suspicious
device that is connected to the LAN of the bot and a period
of time for capturing traffic. It applies ARP spoofing to the
suspicious IP (line 7) and analyzes outgoing traffic from the
IP for the amount of time given by period. It classifies the
suspicious IP as a smart irrigation system if the outgoing
traffic is being sent to known cloud servers. If the period of
time that was specified has passed, it classifies the suspicious
IP as other device. Figure 7 presents accuracy results of
applying Algorithm 1 from a laptop connected to the same
LAN as the smart irrigation systems for various periods of
time. As can be seen in Figure 7, the classification accuracy
Figure 7. Algorithm 1’s accuracy for various time periods.
reaches 99.9% after 10 minutes of analysis and 100% after
15 minutes.
7. Spoofing Attacks
In this section we present a set of spoofing attacks on
commercial smart irrigation systems that a bot can imple-
ment (after detecting a connected smart irrigation system)
in order to spoof the input of the irrigation system. We
consider a spoofing attack that: (1) changes an input to a
smart irrigation system, (2) can be applied remotely by the
attacker from a bot running on a compromised device that is
connected to the LAN, and (3) results in watering according
to the attacker’s wishes. Smart irrigation systems obtain
information from cloud servers, weather forecast services,
and sensors. All of the attacks presented in this section that
were used to spoof smart irrigation system inputs are based
on MITM attacks; the MITM attacks were applied by a bot
running on another device that is connected to the same
LAN and managed to intercept outgoing traffic sent from a
smart irrigation system in order to impersonate to destination
and hijack the entire session.
7.1. Spoofing smart irrigation system configuration
The attacks demonstrated in this subsection represent
attempts to spoof the smart irrigation system’s config-
uration response that is sent from the cloud server by
impersonating the smart irrigation system’s cloud server. We
demonstrate this attack against the GreenIQ smart irrigation
system.
7.1.1. Vulnerability. The cloud server is supposed to me-
diate between a C&C device (e.g., smartphone application)
which can be located anywhere around the world and a smart
irrigation system. Figure 8 outlines the interface between
the GreenIQ application running on a smartphone to the
GreenIQ smart irrigation system via the cloud server. Using
a smartphone application, the user sends C&C commands to
the cloud server (yellow arrow in Figure 8). Independently,
a ping_to_cloud request (that contains the user’s ID) is
launched from the GreenIQ smart irrigation system to the
cloud server every minute in order to obtain the timestamp of
the last time the user updated the watering plan configuration
stored in the cloud server (red arrow in Figure 8). A response
is sent from the cloud server with this timestamp (purple
arrow in Figure 8). If the timestamp received from the
cloud server is greater (after) than the timestamp that is
stored on the GreenIQ smart irrigation system (signifying a
more recent user update), a configxml request to retrieve
the new watering plan configuration is launched by the
GreenIQ smart irrigation system (green arrow in Figure 8).
A response is sent from the cloud server with a file that
contains the new watering plan configuration in XML format
(blue arrow in Figure 8). This XML file contains details
about all of the watering plans scheduled by the user (dates,
hours, duration, zones/valves, etc.). Listing 1 presents the
code that implements the abovementioned description which
was extracted from the main.py file of GreenIQ’s firmware.
312# Check i f c o n f i g . xml was m o d i f i e d .
I f yes , r e t r i e v e i t .
313 i f new_conf ig > c u r r e n t _ c o n f i g :
314 main_log . i n f o ( ’ c o n f i g t ime
u p d a t e d . c u r r e n t _ c o n f i g : %d ,
new_conf ig %d ’ % (
c u r r e n t _ c o n f i g , new_conf ig ) )
315 s2 = GD. g e t _ c o n f i g _ x m l ( hub_hash )
316 i f s2 :
317 c u r r e n t _ c o n f i g = new_conf ig
318 u p d a t e _ p i n g _ t o _ c l o u d _ i m m i d i a t e
= True
319 e l s e :
320 main_log . i n f o ( ’ c o n f i g t ime d i d
n o t change . new_conf ig : %d ’ %
new_conf ig )
Listing 1. GreenIQ’s firmware code extracted from main.py file.
As can be seen in Listing 1, the timestamp configuration
received from the cloud, new_config, is being compared to
current_config, which is the timestamp stored in GreenIQ
of the last time the user updated the watering plan config-
uration (line 313). If an update was made by the user, the
new configuration is retrieved from the cloud server (line
315) and stored in GreenIQ (line 317).
7.1.2. Exploitation. We demonstrate how an attacker can
(1) launch watering using the GreenIQ smart irrigation
system by injecting his/her own watering plans, and (2)
cause the GreenIQ smart irrigation system to deny service
permanently, thereby preventing any remote C&C interface
with the smart irrigation system. Both attacks are applied by
a bot that impersonates a weather forecast service. In our
experiment we used the GreenIQ application to schedule
a watering plan that waters 24/7 (every day, all day long)
for a period of time between two future dates. We captured
HTTP communication between the GreenIQ smart irrigation
system and the cloud server during this time and extracted
the watering plan configuration that was sent from the cloud
server in the XML file. Then, using the GreenIQ application,
we restored the GreenIQ smart irrigation system to its
previous state.
Algorithm 2 presents the exploitation code used to inject
a watering plan for a given future time period.
Figure 8. Session stages between the GreenIQ smart irrigation system and its cloud server. Figure 9. A dry dropper boxed in yellow, and
a dripping dropper (boxed in red) as a result
of applying a watering plan injection attack.
Algorithm 2
1: procedure SPOOFCONFIGURATION(packet,start,end)
2: ping ← ”/php/ping_to_cloud.php”
3: retrieve← ”/php/api/v2/hub/configxml.php”
4: method← packet.http.request.method
5: path← packet.http.request.uri.path
6: dstIP ← packet.ip.dst
7: if dstIP != "www.greeniq.net" then
8: return
9: if (method == "POST" & path == ping) then
10: sendFakeT imestampResponse(end)
11: if (method == "GET" & path == retrieve) then
12: path← createFakeXML(start, end)
13: sendFakeXMLResponse(path)
Algorithm 2 receives a packet sent from the GreenIQ
application and two future timestamps, begin and end,
to launch watering. First, it verifies that the packet was
sent to GreenIQ’s cloud server (line 7). If the packet is
a ping_to_cloud request, a fake timestamp (denoted by
the received parameter end) is sent to the GreenIQ smart
irrigation system by the bot (line 10). A response with a
future timestamp will trigger another request to retrieve
the updated XML configuration launched from the smart
irrigation system. If the received packet is a configxml
request, a fake XML with a watering plan between the
timestamps of begin and end is sent to the smart irrigation
system by the bot (line 13).
We installed this code on a laptop that was connected
to the same LAN as the GreenIQ smart irrigation sys-
tem and applied ARP spoofing in order to refer traffic
from the GreenIQ smart irrigation system to our bot. A
ping_to_cloud request is sent from the GreenIQ smart
irrigation system to its cloud server every minute over HTTP
communication; this request is intercepted by our code. Two
snapshots demonstrating the attack are presented in Figure 9.
As can be seen in the figure, the attack caused the GreenIQ
smart irrigation system to launch watering immediately after
the response was received from the bot. We consider this
attack a watering plan injection attack. It allows the
attacker to trigger the GreenIQ smart irrigation system (via
the bot) to launch watering according to his/her wishes. In
addition, since the GreenIQ smart irrigation system sends
requests to its cloud sever every minute, a watering plan
injection attack can be performed by the attacker close to
the time of the DDoS attack making it harder for detection.
We analyzed the code that was extracted from the
GreenIQ firmware, and this is presented in Listing 1. As
can be seen from line 312 (the if condition), this code
verifies whether the received timestamp (new_config) is
greater (after) than the timestamp stored in the GreenIQ
smart irrigation system (current_config). If new_config
is greater (after), the new timestamp is stored in the GreenIQ
smart irrigation system, and the corresponding watering
plan configuration is retrieved from the cloud server. No
other verification regarding the correctness of the timestamp
received, stored in new_config is performed. This can be
exploited by the attacker who can use the bot in order to
cause the GreenIQ smart irrigation system to permanently
deny service by implementing Algorithm 2 with an end
timestamp value that is far into the future (e.g., the times-
tamp of 1/1/2022). By applying the following, the bot causes
the GreenIQ smart irrigation system to ignore any C&C
command that is launched by the user until the time that
is mentioned in the response, because any C&C command
during this period of time will not be considered by the
GreenIQ smart irrigation system as a user update (line 313
of the code in Listing 1). By combining a permanent denial
of service attack (by replying with a future watering plan,
e.g., the timestamp of 1/1/2022), with a watering plan
injection attack that triggers the GreenIQ smart irrigation
system to launch watering 24/7, the bot causes the irrigation
system to start watering indefinitely and prevents the user
from remotely stopping the watering using a C&C device.
The only way in which the GreenIQ owner can stop the
GreenIQ smart irrigation system from watering in this attack
scenario is by physically turning off the main water line. In
order to restore the GreenIQ smart irrigation system regular
operation, the user would have to apply a factory reset to
delete the future timestamp.
7.2. Spoofing weather forecast
The attacks demonstrated in this subsection represent
attempts to spoof the weather forecast response sent from a
weather forecast server by impersonating a weather forecast
service. We demonstrate this attack against the RainMachine
smart irrigation system.
7.2.1. Vulnerability. The RainMachine smart irrigation sys-
tem was designed to save water and money by automatically
adapting its watering plan to weather forecasts. It allows
the user to configure a base watering plan according to the
amount of water that is needed to water his/her yard and
plants. Given the base watering plan configuration and the
weather forecast (obtained from weather forecast services),
the RainMachine smart irrigation system adapts its watering
plan automatically. This means that for a rainy/cold weather
forecast, watering will not take place, or only a percentage
of the amount of water required by the base watering plan
will be used (just the amount needed in order to fulfill the
water requirements specified in the user’s configuration).
In cases in which there is a forecast for dry weather, the
RainMachine smart irrigation system automatically adjusts
itself to compensate for a lack of precipitation by sup-
plementing with watering plans that consume the required
amount of water, based on the user’s configuration of the
base watering plan. We analyzed the RainMachine smart
irrigation system’s firmware and found the MainActivity.java
file. RainMachine smart irrigation system contains a touch-
screen that presents the weather forecast for the upcoming
week. In addition, it presents the percentage of water that
the smart irrigation system plans to consume in order to
fulfill the water requirements specified in the base watering
plan configured by the user. We searched for the code that
calculates the exact percentage of water that is going to be
consumed by the RainMachine smart irrigation system each
day during the upcoming week and found that it relies on
the amount of rain that is forecast for each day, as can be
seen in Listing 2.
370 i n t p e r c e n t V a l u e = Math . round ( 1 0 0 . 0 f
∗ ( ( F l o a t ) ( ( MainDayViewModel )
viewModel . days . g e t ( s t a r t D a t e .
p lusDays ( indexDay ) ) ) .
programWaterNeed . g e t ( viewModel .
indexProgram ) ) . f l o a t V a l u e ( ) ) ;
Listing 2. RainMachine’s firmware code from MainActivity.java file
We continued to analyze the RainMachine smart irriga-
tion system’s firmware searching for the word "Weather."
Listing 3 presents code from the ParserResponse.java
file of weather forecast services that the RainMachine smart
irrigation system interfaces with.
p u b l i c boolean isNOAA ( )
p u b l i c boolean isMETNO ( )
p u b l i c boolean isWUnderground ( )
p u b l i c boolean i s F o r e c a s t I O ( )
p u b l i c boolean isNETATMO ( )
p u b l i c boolean isCIMIS ( )
p u b l i c boolean isFAWN ( )
p u b l i c boolean i s W e a t h e r R u l e s ( )
p u b l i c boolean isPWS ( )
Listing 3. List of weather services extracted from RainMachine firmware
We searched for these names on the Internet and found
the weather forecast services that appear in Listing 3. We
analyzed the REST API for each weather forecast service
that was found in Listing 3. We note the following interest-
ing observation: during the time in which this research was
conducted, most of the weather forecast services provided
a REST API based on HTTP communication. Figure 10
presents the REST API interface between the RainMachine
smart irrigation system and a weather forecast service.
An HTTP request that contains RainMachine’s location (in
latitude-longitude format) is sent from the RainMachine
smart irrigation system to a weather forecast service. A
response is sent from the weather forecast service in the
form of a file in XML format that contains the weather
forecast (hourly resolution) with various details including:
temperature, wind direction and speed, cloudiness, humidity,
barometric pressure, etc. Four requests per day are launched
by the RainMachine smart irrigation system to the weather
forecast service, and based on the weather forecast received,
the RainMachine smart irrigation system adjusts its future
watering plans.
7.2.2. Exploitation. We demonstrate how an attacker can
manipulate the RainMachine smart irrigation system to
schedule unnecessary watering plans based on his/her
wishes by impersonating a weather forecast service and
injecting a fake weather forecast. We analyzed the Met.no
API and found that it provides a REST interface based
on HTTP communication. We identified the format of the
response sent from the Met.no weather forecast service,
and based on these findings, we wrote a Python code that
changes weather forecast parameters between two given
timestamps.
We installed our code on a laptop that was connected to
the same LAN as the RainMachine smart irrigation system
and implemented an ARP spoofing attack to refer traffic sent
from the RainMachine smart irrigation system to the Met.no
weather forecast service. Originally, the RainMachine smart
irrigation system was configured to work in London. We
performed the attack during the winter; since London is
rainy in the winter, no watering would likely be needed
in order to fulfill the requirements of the base watering
plan configuration. Accordingly, RainMachine adapted its
watering plan to consume no water for the upcoming week,
as can be seen in Figure 11a which presents RainMachine
smart irrigation system’s screen before the attack.
Figure 10. Session stages between RainMachine smart irrigation system and Met.no weather
forecast service
Figure 11. The original weather forecast in
London (upper picture) was spoofed to a fake
weather forecast (lower picture)
A request to the Met.no weather forecast service is
sent every six hours from the RainMachine smart irrigation
system over HTTP communication and in this attack such a
request was intercepted by our code. As can be seen in the
Figure 11a, the original weather forecast for London did
not require any watering at all, because the temperatures
forecasted were between -1◦and 12◦for the entire week.
However, implementing the attack caused this temperature
to be changed to values between 0◦and 50◦. As a result, the
RainMachine smart irrigation system immediately adjusted
its watering plan to compensate for these temperatures by
scheduling watering plans, as can be seen in Figure 11b.
Another way of manipulating the RainMachine smart
irrigation system in order to schedule unnecessary watering
plans is by changing the location of the request sent from
the RainMachine system to the weather forecast service to
the most arid place on Earth for the day on which the attack
is performed. The previous attack, which responds with a
fake XML file, required the attacker to identify the format
of the XML response that is sent from the weather forecast
service. The current attack requires a much simpler process
of changing the request location (longitude, latitude) value
that is supplied as part of the request. We conducted an
additional experiment in which we performed the attack
by changing the location of the request from London to
Algeria which was the driest and hottest place on Earth
when we performed the attack. As a result of the attack,
the RainMachine smart irrigation system adapted itself au-
tomatically to compensate for the dry weather and scheduled
watering plans. Although the response sent from the Met.no
weather forecast service contained the coordinates of the city
in Algeria, the RainMachine smart irrigation system did not
identified this change and accepted the new weather forecast.
As a result, it adjusted its watering plan to compensate for
the lack of water and the weather in Algeria.
We consider these attacks weather forecast injection
attacks. They allow an attacker to trigger the RainMachine
smart irrigation system (via the bot) to launch watering
based on his/her wishes. In addition, since the RainMachine
smart irrigation system sends requests to weather forecast
services every six hours, a weather forecast injection attack
can be performed by the attacker around the time of the
DDoS attack.
7.3. Sensor attacks
Many smart irrigation systems allow sensor connectivity,
using sensors like rain sensors, water flow sensors, and soil
moisture sensors to regulate watering and water consump-
tion more efficiently. IoT device sensor attacks are very
common and can appear in one of the following ways:
• Compromising a sensor - the attacker manages to
compromise a sensor (e.g., using a supply chain
attack, exploiting an OS vulnerability). As a result,
the sensor sends false data.
• Spoofing outgoing communication from the sen-
sor - the attacker manages to change the data that
is sent from the sensor (e.g., using a MITM attack).
• Physically influencing the sensor - the attacker
manages to influence the phenomena that is being
measured (e.g., by hitting a temperature meter, pour-
ing water on a rain or water moisture sensor) so false
measurements were obtained.
Spoofing a sensor’s output with any of the abovemen-
tioned methods will influence the operation of smart irriga-
tion systems. Smart irrigation systems with a connected rain
sensor allow the user to define rules that prevent watering
on rainy days. Considering this fact, spoofing a rain sensor’s
data so that it won’t notify the smart irrigation system when
it is rainy causes the daily watering program to work as usual
instead of being disabled during rainy weather.
However, since smart irrigation systems were just intro-
duced a few years ago, the current generation of commercial
smart irrigation systems supports only wire connectivity to
a reserved set of connectors that can be found on the smart
irrigation system SoC board. This fact limits the type of
attacks that can be performed by the attacker in order to
spoof sensor data because: (1) spoofing outgoing communi-
cation from the sensors requires physical access to the cable
that connects the sensor with the smart irrigation system,
(2) physical attacks (the third type of attack mentioned
above) on many sensors are not practical, since they require
many people to engage with the sensors of the attacked
smart irrigation system during the time of the attack, and
(3) compromising a massive amount of sensors can only
be done using a supply chain attack, which is not easy to
perform.
We believe that next generation of smart irrigation sys-
tems will support wireless connectivity to sensors, creating
a new attack vector for spoofing data that is sent from the
sensor remotely to the smart irrigation system.
8. Replay Attacks
In this section we present a set of replay attacks that
can be implemented by a bot against a commercial smart
irrigation system in order to launch watering. A replay attack
(or playback attack) is a form of network attack in which a
valid data transmission is maliciously or fraudulently trans-
mitted. We consider a replay attack that: (1) can be applied
remotely by the attacker by a bot running on a compromised
device that is connected to the LAN, (2) results in watering
according to attacker’s wishes, and (3) exploits a legitimate
HMI interface for C&C as a means of attack. The attacks
demonstrated in this section were performed by a bot that
is running on another device that is connected to the same
LAN as the smart irrigation system and generates
8.1. Scheduling a watering plan
The attack demonstrated in this subsection is scheduling
watering plan attack. We demonstrate this attack against the
BlueSpray smart irrigation system.
8.1.1. Vulnerability. All smart irrigation systems provide
an HMI to a C&C device. The HMI can be operated from
various C&C devices including a mobile application, Web
browser, or smart assistant. Using a C&C device, the user
can use the HMI to: (1) connect the smart irrigation system
to a LAN, (2) update the watering plan configuration, (3)
monitor the watering history, (4) define zones, (5), add
sensors, etc. BlueSpray provides an HMI interface based on
PCs and laptops via a Web browser that is based on HTTP
communication. The user can open a Web browser (Chrome,
Firefox, etc.) from another device that is connected to the
same LAN, type BlueSpray’s IP address, and send it C&C
commands. Listing 4 presents a payload (JSON format)
extracted from an HTTP packet for scheduling a watering
plan that was sent from a Chrome browser to the BlueSpray
smart irrigation system.
1{ " a c t i o n " : " s e t " , " d a t a " : [ { " e n a b l e d " :1 ,
" t y p e " :2 , " program " :10 , " r p t " : [ 0 ] , "
s e a s o n " :0 , " c y c l e " : [ 5 , 6 0 ] , " name " : "
New run " , " s t a r t _ d a t e " : " 2018−06−17
Figure 12. BlueSpray’s Web user interface. Before the attack (upper picture)
there are no watering plans, and after the attack (lower picture) watering
plans have been scheduled for the entire week.
" , " s t a r t _ t i m e " :0 , " i d " :5 , " f l a g " : "
change " } ] , " msgid " :77080 }
Listing 4. Payload of an HTTP request sent to BlueSpray
We were surprised to find that no authentication is
required in order to communicate with the BlueSpray smart
irrigation system from another device that is connected to
the same LAN.
8.1.2. Exploitation. We demonstrate how an attacker can
launch watering via the BlueSpray smart irrigation system
by scheduling watering plans according to his/her wishes.
We analyzed the HTTP packets of watering plan updates
sent from a laptop to the BlueSpray smart irrigation system
from a PC connected to the same LAN via the Chrome Web
browser and learned how such a request is generated. Based
on our findings, we wrote a Python code that schedules
watering between two given timestamps using HTTP request
that is sent to the BlueSpray smart irrigation system.
We reset the BlueSpray smart irrigation system to its
previous configuration with no watering plans. We installed
our code on a laptop that was connected to the same LAN
and ran the code. The code launched an HTTP request to
schedule watering plans for the entire week. Two snapshots
that demonstrate this attack scenario are presented in Figure
12. As can be seen in Figure 12, our code successfully
scheduled new watering plans for the BlueSpray smart
irrigation system.
8.2. Opening the valves of a smart irrigation system
The attacks demonstrated in this subsection were imple-
mented on the GreenIQ smart irrigation system.
8.2.1. Vulnerability. We analyzed the GreenIQ smart irri-
gation system’s firmware and looked for the code that opens
a valve. Listing 5 presents code from the greeniq_defs.py
file.
Listing 5. A code for opening a valve (extracted from GreenIQ firmware)
221def s e t _ g p i o (MAX_PORTS, gpio_map ,
gpio_command , h i g h _ i s ) :
222 g l o b a l m o d e l _ u t i l i t i e s
223 m o d e l _ u t i l i t i e s . s e t _ g p i o (
MAX_PORTS, gpio_map ,
gpio_command , h i g h _ i s )
Figure 13. (a) an empty glass, and (b) a glass that is being filled as a result
of a compromised device that uses SSH communication to launch watering
A GPIO (general purpose input output) interface is used
by the GreenIQ smart irrigation system’s SoC board (Rasp-
berry Pi) to control the connected valves. We looked in the
firmware’s code for a specific call to the function set_gpio()
and found the following code (presented in Listing 6) in the
greeniq_defs.py file:
Listing 6. Execution of the code for opening a valve (Listing 6)
427# T e s t i n g − Opera te Master Va lve
428 s e t _ g p i o (MAX_PORTS, gpio_map , ’
00000010 ’ , h i g h _ i s )
429 t ime . s l e e p ( t e s t _ p r e i o d )
Closing the valves is handled
by executing the following code:
set_gpio(MAX_PORTS, gpio_map,′ 00000000′, high_is).
8.2.2. Exploitation. We demonstrate an opening valve at-
tack by opening and closing the master valve every 10
seconds using SSH communication from a laptop that is
connected to GreenIQ smart irrigation system’s LAN. Two
snapshots from the experiment are presented in Figure 13.
As can be seen in Figure 13, watering starts and ends
every 10 seconds. An opening valve attack can be imple-
mented from a bot running on: (1) a compromised device
connected to the LAN of the GreenIQ smart irrigation
system using SSH communication and a password (as we
did), and (2) the GreenIQ smart irrigation system itself. This
allows the attacker to trigger the GreenIQ smart irrigation
system (via the bot) to launch watering according to his/her
wishes.
9. Calculating the Damage
In this section we describe two methods to calculate the
damage that can be caused by applying a distributed attack
on urban water services: (1) a theoretical calculation using
a flow network, and (2) an empirical estimation using an
experiment.
9.1. Calculating the damage using a flow network
Given an area with a pipeline system that distributes
water obtained from an areal water reservoir to clients/sinks
(e.g., homes, yards/gardens, public locations, etc.), we calcu-
late potential water waste and financial damage by modeling
the area’s pipeline system as a flow network and identifying
maximum flow in the network with well-known algorithms.
A flow network is defined as quartet of (G,c,s,t), where G
= (V,E) is a directed graph, c is a capacity function, s is
a source vertex, and t is a target vertex. Given an areal
distribution pipeline with water providers (e.g., water reser-
voirs, water tanks), water consumers (e.g., houses, schools,
etc.), and a network of pipelines, we build a flow network
as follows:
Vertices
1) Let V’ be a set of vertices, where v belongs to V’
if it is a water reservoir.
2) Let V” be a set of vertices, where v belongs to V”
if it is a pipeline junction.
3) Let V”’ be a set of vertices, where v belongs to V”’
if it is a sink/water consumer (e.g., house, school,
etc.), and a smart irrigation system is not connected
to the consumer.
4) Let V”” be a set of vertices, where v belongs to V””
if it is a sink/water consumer (e.g., house, school,
etc.), and a smart irrigation system is connected to
the consumer.
5) Let us define a new supersource vertex s and new
supersink vertex t.
The entire set of vertices V is defined as follows: V =
V ′ ∪ V ′′ ∪ V ′′′ ∪ V ′′′′ ∪ {s, t}
Edges
1) Let E’ be a set of edges, where e = (v1,v2) belongs
to E’ if a pipeline between v1 and v2 exists (v1,v2
belongs to V).
2) Let E” be a set of edges between the source vertex
s to every vertex in V’.
3) Let E”’ be a set of edges between every sink vertex
v (belongs to V””) that has a smart irrigation system
to the target vertex t.
The entire set of edges E is defined as follows: E = R′ ∪
E′′ ∪ E′′′ The entire graph G is defined by G = (V,E)
Capacity function
Let c be a capacity function from edges to a real number
defined as follows:
c(v1, v2) =

∞ if v1 ∈ V ′
w if v2 ∈ V ′′
corresponding
pipeline
capacity
otherwise
(1)
where w is the average amount of water that can be
consumed by a smart irrigation system.
The flow network is defined by (G,c,s,t). An edge from
a vertex to t in a flow network (G,c,s,t) exists only if the
vertex contains a connected smart irrigation system. Let us
assume that each bot can consume the maximum amount of
water that can be supplied to the household by opening all
of the smart irrigation valves. The potential water wasted
can be calculated by applying well- known algorithms for
maximum flow problems (Ford-Fulkerson, Edmonds-Karp,
Figure 14. Modeling pipeline system that distributes water as flow network
TABLE 1. DAMAGE CALCULATION
Botnet size
(number of
sprinklers)
Amount
of time
Average
amount
of water
wasted
1 1 hour 2.795 m3
1,355 1 hour
3,787 m3
Typical
water tower
capacity
13,550 6 minutes
143,200 1 hour
404,244 m3
Floodwater
reservoir
capacity
23,866 6 hours
MPM, and Dinic’s algorithm) on the constructed flow net-
work and determining the amount of water flow that is found
in the supersink vertex t. The financial damage can be
calculated by multiplying the following: the maximum flow
of the supersink vertex f, the average combined water tariff
in the area, and the time period of the attack.
9.2. Estimating the damage using an experiment
An alternative way to estimate the damage that can
be caused by applying a distributed attack on urban water
services is by calculating the amount of water that can be
consumed from a sprinkler. A typical sprinkler’s water flow
is between 0.66 to 4.93 cubic meters per hour (as can be
seen in the specs of the Falcon 6504 sprinkler [57]). Let
us assume that the attacker controls a botnet of N smart
irrigation systems (each of which is connected to a single
sprinkler) which are operated for a given period of time
t. The expected water waste caused by applying the attack
is calculated by multiplying the average water flow (2.795
cubic meters per hour) by the size of the botnet and the
amount of time (the duration of the attack):
wasted water (m3) = 2.795×N × T (2)
Table 1 presents the calculation of the damaged that can
be caused (wasted water) by applying the attack with various
numbers of bots and periods of time.
A standard water tower capacity is 3,785 cubic meters
(according to [58]) and as can be seen in Table 1, it requires
a botnet of 1,355 sprinklers that water a single hour in order
to waste 3,787 cubic meters, a volume of water which is
greater than capacity of a standard water tower. A small
floodwater reservoir capacity is 400,000 cubic meters (e.g.,
Betarim [59]) and as can be seen in Table 1, it requires a
botnet of 23,866 sprinklers that water six hours (overnight)
in order to waste 404,244 cubic meters, a volume of water
which is greater than capacity of a small floodwater reser-
voir.
10. Countermeasures
In this section we describe countermeasures to detect
and prevent a distributed attack against urban water ser-
vices. A distributed attack launched from smart irrigation
systems can be detected by deploying a model that monitors
unusual water consumption in urban water services (e.g.,
using anomaly detection methods). However, even if such
an attack can be detected by an urban watering service,
its ability to react to such an attack is very limited. The
only thing that an urban watering service can do when such
an attack is detected is stop water distribution. While this
solution prevents the attacker from wasting any more water,
it also prevents people from obtaining water which is the aim
of the attacker. Preventing people from obtaining a resource
from critical infrastructure can even be considered a national
disaster, as was the case in the cyber attack against the
Ukrainian power grid [3]. Preventing a bot from imperson-
ating a party that a smart irrigation system interfaces with
can be done by upgrading HTTP communication to HTTPS
communication. Doing this will prevent the attacker from
spoofing TCP packets . In addition, SSH communication is
not needed in order to communicate with a smart irrigation
system when a cloud serves as a mediator, so disabling SSH
communication will prevent attackers from executing a code
on smart irrigation systems by detecting weak passwords.
11. Ethical Considerations and Disclosure
We performed full ethical disclosure, revealing the vul-
nerabilities discussed in this paper and providing all of the
relevant technical details and suggestions for addressing
them to GreenIQ, RainMachine, and BlueSpray in June
2018. We received confirmation of our findings from each of
them. GreenIQ thanked us for sharing our findings and de-
cided to apply HTTPS communication between their smart
irrigation system and cloud server. In addition, they decided
to close the SSH port in their firmware to prevent an attacker
from running Python code for watering. In June 2018 the
Norwegian Meteorological Institute (Met.no) upgraded their
HTTP API to an HTTPS version.
12. Discussion
The distributed attack described in this paper can result
in (1) the DOS of water service in cities in which water is
not provided by a natural water source (e.g., groundwater),
and (2) financial damage. The proposed IoT botnet can also
be used to attack other types of critical infrastructure as
well. For example, it can be used to attack the smart grid
which uses smart homes to produce electricity in order to
implement a DoS attack on power distribution services (an-
other critical infrastructure) in a neighborhood, as opposed
to performing an attack directly on the regional electric-
ity company. Another interesting method for triggering the
attack, that does not require to compromise a device that
is connected to a LAN of smart irrigation system, targets
smart assistants which can be used to control smart irrigation
systems. For example, an attacker could replicate Burger
King’s method and launch a Google query to Google Home
(a smart assistant) by placing an ad on national televi-
sion that contains an embedded message which initiates
watering [34]. The Google query could even be launched
via ultrasound [60] using the advertisement. Given that
recently malware has been used to attack smart refrigerators,
air conditioning systems, thermostats, TVs, and now smart
irrigation systems, we can only hypothesize whether the next
generation of technicians will have to become cyber security
analysts. The question remains: will Wireshark replace the
traditional monkey wrench and Phillips screwdriver?
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